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Abstract This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007TAC Market Design Game. We
present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to com-
pare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate marketdynamics to the auction rules
adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via aset of post-tournament exper-
iments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction
mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.
Keywords Double auction· Mechanism design· Trading agent competition
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the Market Design game that was run as part of the Trading
Agent Competition [44] (TAC) in July 2007. The Trading Agent Competitions have been
held annually since 2000 with the aim of encouraging research into software agents that
can bid for goods and services on behalf of their human owners[15,20]. There have been
several different games, but up until 2007 competing in these games had involved designing
an agent that could bid effectively and make profitable transactions — the researchers who
entered the games were, naturally, interested in how best todo his bidding. Our research,
in contrast, is more concerned with the design of markets in which trading agents interact,
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and we introduced the Market Design game to encourage research in this area. The game
was certainly successful in attracting entrants, and we hadan exciting competition, but, as
discussed below, there is not much that one can learn from thegame itself.1 The value of
the competition is that it gives rise to a set of strategies that can be subsequently analyzed to
extract general conclusions about how to approach problemslike those in the competition.
It is the aim of this paper to provide such an analysis.
1.1 Background
Auctions are special markets with restricted rules. Different auction designs may vary sig-
nificantly in properties including efficiency, profit, and transaction volume. Well-designed
auctions result in desired economic outcomes and are widelyused in solving real-world
resource allocation problems, and in structuring stock andfutures exchanges. As a result,
the field of auction mechanism design has drawn much attention in recently years from
economists, mathematicians, and computer scientists [3,19].
In traditional auction theory, auctions are viewed as gamesof incomplete information,
and traditional analytic methods from game theory have beensuccessfully applied to some
single-sided auctions, where a single seller has goods for sale (or a single buyer desi es to
purchase goods) and multiple buyers bid for the goods (or seller offer the goods), and some
simple forms ofdouble auctions(DAs), where there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers
and both sides may makeoffersor shouts.
However, as, for example, Friedman [8] has pointed out,DAs, particularlycontinuous
double auctions(CDAs),2 are too complex to analyze in this way since at every moment, a
trader must compute expected utility-maximizing shouts based on the history of shouts and
transactions and the time remaining in the auction. This difficulty led researchers to seek
experimental approaches. Smith [40] pioneered this field and showed, through a series of
experiments with human subjects, that evenCDAs with just a handful of traders can give
high allocative efficiency and quick convergence to the theoretical equilibrium. Software
agents armed with various learning algorithms and optimization techniques have been shown
to produce outcomes similar to those obtained by human subjects [5,14], are capable of
generating higher individual profits [6], and can be used to explore the properties of auction
mechanisms [53].
In parallel with the automation of traders, computer scientists have started to explore
the automated design of auction mechanisms. Thus, Cliff [4]explored a continuous space
of auction mechanisms by varying the probability of the nextshout (at any point in time)
being made by a seller, denoted byQs, and found that aQs that corresponds to a completely
new kind of auction led to faster transaction price convergence. Phelpset al. [35] showed
that genetic programming can be used to find an optimal point in a space of pricing policies,
where the notion of optimality is based on allocative efficien y and trader market power. Niu
et al. [25] presented a mechanism that minimizes variation in transaction price, confirming
the mechanism through an evolutionary exploration. Pardoeand Stone [28] suggested a self-
adapting auction mechanism that adjusts parameters in response to past results.
Although these evolutionary or adaptive approaches involve automatic processes, they
make use of an array of candidate auction rules or parameterizable frameworks that are
1 At the time of writing there have been two further Market Design games, in July 2008 and July 2009.
2 A CDA is a continuousDA in which any trader can accept an offer and make a deal at any time during
the auction period.
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initially conceived by humans. Moreover, the result of an evolutionary exploration or an
adaptive process, may depend on the quality of the candidatesolutions which the process
starts with — this was certainly the experience we had in [32]and [33].
When we started discussing the design of the Market Design game, our hope was to
provoke further research in this form of mechanism design, co centrating on the continu-
ous double auction. Previous studies usually present comparison of auction mechanisms in
different proprietary settings which differ in terms of theinformation available to traders,
computational resources and so on. As a result, mechanisms are difficult to compare, and
we thought that offering a competition on a shared software platform would encourage the
development of mechanisms that could be more easily compared. However, there was an-
other aspect of existing work on double auctions that we wanted to address, that is the fact
that all the work we were aware of considered single auctions, perating in isolation.3 In
contrast, not only do traders in an auction compete against each other, real markets face
competition from other markets [39] and we wanted the MarketDesign game to reflect this
kind of interaction. The format of the game we came up with is as follows. Each entrant
in the competition provides aspecialistthat regulates a market with a set of auction rules,
and these specialists compete against each other to attracttraders and make profit. Traders
in these games are provided by the competition platform and ech of them learns to choose
the best market to trade in. Because the Market Design game reverses the usual format of
TAC competitions, we call it theCAT game.4
1.2 Strategy evaluation in competitive games
Trading competitions likeCAT have been an effective tool in fostering innovative approaches
and advocating enthusiasm and exchange among researchers [42,49]. However, the compe-
titions themselves usually cannot provide a complete view of the relative strength and weak-
ness of entries. In a competition, the performance of one player closely depends upon the
composition of its opponents and the competition configuration, and the scenarios consid-
ered are usually limited. Thus we typically turn to post-competition analysis to tell us which
entries are most interesting. Ideally, such an analysis will cover all possible scenarios, but
this usually presents too large a possible space. As a result, a common practice is to de-
liberately select a limited number of representative strategies and run games corresponding
to a set of discrete points or trajectories in the infinite space, ssuming that the results are
representative of what would happen in the whole space were one to explore it [41].
There are two common types of approaches to post-competition analysis:white-boxap-
proaches andblack-boxapproaches. A white-box approach attempts to relate the internal
logic and features of strategies to game outcomes. In the Santa Fe Double Auction Tourna-
ment and post-tournament experiments [37], a thorough examination of auction efficiency
losses indicated that the success of theKAPLAN trading strategy is due to its patience in
waiting to exploit other trading strategies. In Axelrod’s Computer Prisoner’s Dilemma Tour-
nament [1], the strong showing ofTIT FOR TAT is attributed to the fact that it is forgiving
as well as being cooperative. While a white-box approach is often domain-dependent, the
insights obtained in the concerned domain may still be extended to other domains. For in-
stance, the payoff structure in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma problem captures the nature
of many other issues that are faced by parties with conflicting interests.
3 Even work like [2,36] that compares two kinds of auction looks at the properties of each kind of auction
operating in isolation.
4 It is also the case that “catallactics” is the science of exchanges.
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A black-box approach, on the other hand, considers strategies as atomic entities. One
perspective is anecologicalone based onreplicator dynamics, from which the entities are
biological individuals in an infinitely large population and a sub-population playing a par-
ticular strategy grows in proportion to how well that strategy performs relative to the whole
population in average [11]. Walshet al. [47] combines the game-theoretic solution concept
of Nash equilibrium and replicator dynamics, turning a potentially very complex, multi-
stage game of trading strategies into a one-shot game in normal form. What’s more, a tech-
nique calledperturbation analysisis used to evaluate whether a strategy can be improved
further. Phelpset al. [31,32] successfully applied this approach in acquiring a better trad-
ing strategy forDA markets. Jordanet al. [16] took a similar approach to the evaluation of
entries in theTAC Supply Chain Management Tournament (SCM) and other games [17].
1.3 Our contribution
This paper makes three main contributions. After a brief description of the game, it provides
a classification of the entries based on their internal designs, and uses this classification to
compare these entries. Since all the entries are double auction markets, this classification
is a refinement of the classification presented in [52]. The paper then presents a white-box
analysis of those entries to 2007CAT competition (CAT 2007) that were available in the
TAC agent repository,5 and attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted
by these entries and their adaptive strategies through a setof post-tournament experiments.
Finally, the paper performs a black-box analysis on the sameset of specialists, examining the
relative strength and weakness of the specialists in several scenarios, demonstrating some
vulnerabilities in entries that placed highly in the competition.
This paper combines, revises and extends [22] and [23], in particular providing more
explanation and additional results from the black-box analysis.
2 The Market Design game
2.1 Game procedure
A CAT game lasts a certain number ofdays, each day consists ofrounds, and each round
lasts a certain number ofticks, or milliseconds. Each game involves traders, which buy and
sell goods, and specialists, which provide markets for those goods, enabling the trade. All
traders and specialists are required to check in with the game server prior to the start of a
game, and the list of all clients are broadcast to each clientafterwards.
Before the opening of each day, the specialists are requiredto announce their price
lists, which are then forwarded to all clients by the game server. After a day is opened,
traders can register with one of the specialists (and only one specialist). Their choice of
specialist depends on both the announced fees for that day, but also on the profits obtained in
previous days. Traders will tend to choose specialists where they expect the highest profits.
After a day closes, information on the profit by each specialist nd the number of traders
registered with it is disclosed, which allows specialists to adapt or learn to improve their
competitiveness and eventually obtain higher scores.
Trading only takes place during a round. In a given round traders submit shouts to the
specialists they are registered with and those specialistshave the option to accept or reject
5 http://www.sics.se/tac/showagents.php .
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shouts. A shout that is accepted becomes active, and remainsact ve until it is successfully
matched with another shout or the trading day ends. A specialist may matchasks(shouts
to sell) andbids (shouts to buy) any time during a round, clearing the market.A matched
bid must have a higher price than the corresponding ask, and the transaction price that is set
must fall in between.
2.2 Traders
Each trading agent is assigned private values for the goods to be raded. The private values
and the number of goods to buy or sell make the demand and supply of the markets. The
private values remain constant during a day, but may change from day to day. Each trading
agent is also endowed with atrading strategyand amarket selection strategyto do two tasks
respectively. One is to decide how to make offers, and the othr is to choose market to make
offers in. These two tasks allow our traders to exhibit intellig nce in two, orthogonal, ways.
2.2.1 Trading strategies
Every trader uses one of the following four trading strategies, which have been extensively
researched in the literature and some of them have shown to work well in practice:
– ZI-C (Zero Intelligence with Constraint): a simple strategy [14] which picks offers ran-
domly but ensures the trader does not make a loss;
– RE (Roth and Erev): a strategy [7] that uses the profit earned through the previous shout
as a reward signal and learns the best profit margin level to set, mimicking human game-
playing behavior in extensive form games;
– ZIP (Zero Intelligence Plus): a strategy [5] that adapts its profit margin by using the
Widrow-Hoff algorithm [50] to remain competitive in the market based upon informa-
tion about shouts and transactions; and
– GD (Gjerstad and Dickhaut): a sophisticated strategy [13] that estimates the probability
of an offer being accepted from the distribution of past offers, and chooses the offer
which maximizes its expected utility.
ZIP and GD require information about the offers made by other traders and the results of
those offers thatZI-C andRE do not need, and so traders that use these strategies may incur
higher costs when specialists impose charges on shout and transaction information.
2.2.2 Market selection strategies
The market selection strategies that are possibly adopted by a trading agent include:
– random: the trader randomly picks a market;
– ε-greedy: the trader treats the choice of market as ann- rmed bandit problem which it
solves using anε-greedy exploration policy [43]. Anε-greedy trader takes daily profits
as rewards when updating its value function.
An ε-greedy trader chooses what it estimates to be the best market with probability
1− ε , and randomly chooses one of the remaining markets otherwis. ε may remain
constant or be variable over time, depending upon the value the parameterα [43]. If α
is 1,ε remains constant, while ifα takes any value in(0,1), ε will reduce over time.
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– softmax: the trader is similar to anε-greedy trader except that it uses a softmax explo-
ration policy [43] in then-armed bandit algorithm.
Unlike anε-greedy trader, a softmax trader does not treat all markets,other than the best
market, exactly the same. If it does not choose the best market, it weights the choice of
remaining market so that it is more likely to choose better makets. The parameterτ
in the softmax strategy controls the relative importance ofthe weights a trader assigns
markets, and similar toε it may be fixed or variable controlled byα .
2.3 Specialists
Specialists facilitate trade by matching asks and bids and determining the trading price in an
exchange market. Each specialist operates its own exchangemarket and may choose what-
ever auction rules for desired performance. Specialists are permitted and even encouraged to
have adaptive strategies such that the policies change during the course of a game in response
to market conditions. Section 3 presents a generic framework for discussing specialists in
terms of the various policies that they implement.
A specialist can set its fees, orp ice list, which are charged to traders and other spe-
cialists who wish to use the services provided by the specialist. Each specialist is free to
set the level of the charges (from zero up to some reasonable upp r bounds). These are the
following:
– Registration fees. Fees charged for registering with a specialist.
– Information fees. Fees for receiving market information from a specialist.
– Shout fees. Fees for successfully placing asks and bids.
– Transaction fees.A flat charge for each successful transaction.
– Profit fees. A share of the profit made by traders, where a trader’s profit is calculated as
the difference between the shout and transaction price.
The first four types of fees are each a flat charge, and the last one is a percentage charged on
the profit made by a trader. A trader pays the registration andinformation fees at most once
every trading day.
2.4 Assessment
The performance of specialists in aCAT game is assessed every day on multiple criteria.
To encourage sustainable operation, not all the trading days will be used for assessment
purposes, despite the fact that the game has a start-day and an end-day, and the selected
assessment days are kept secret to entrants until they have been passed.
Each specialist is assessed on three criteria on each assessment day:
– profit: the profit score of a specialist on a particular day is given by the total profits
obtained by that specialist on that day as a proportion of thetotal profits obtained by all
specialists on that same day.
– market share: of those traders who have registered with a specialist on a particular day,
the market share score of a specialist on that day is the proporti n of traders that have
registered with that specialist on that day.
– transaction success rate: the transaction success rate score for a specialist on a given
day is the proportion of asks and bids placed with that specialist on that day which
that specialist is able to match. In the case where no shouts are pl ced, the transaction
success rate score is calculated as zero.

















Fig. 1: The architecture ofJCAT.
Each of these three criteria results in a value for each specialist for each day between 0 and 1.
The three criteria are then weighted equally and added together to produce a combined score
for each specialist for each assessment day. Scores are thensummed across all assessment
days to produce a final game score for each specialist. The specialist with the highest final
game score will be declared the winner of the game.
2.5 Competition platform
JCAT [24], the platform that supportsCAT games, extends the single-threading Java Auction
Simulator API (JASA) [30], and adopts a client/server architecture. As Fig. 1 illustrates,
the CAT server works as a communication hub, central time controller, and data logging
facility, and CAT clients — either specialists or traders — communicate with each other
via the server. On one hand, theCAT server takes traders’ requests, including registering
with a specialist, placing and modifying shouts, and forwards them to specialists; on the
other hand, specialists notify theCAT server of matching shouts and, via the server, inform
traders. The behaviors of theCAT server andCAT clients are regulated by theCAT Protocol,
or CATP, which is detailed in [27]. TheCAT server uses a registry component to record all
game events and validate requests from traders and specialists. Various game report modules
are available to process subsets of game events, calculate and output different metrics for
post-game analysis.
3 Components of specialists
A specialist may adopt various auction rules.JCAT provides a reference implementation of
a parameterizable specialist that can be easily configured and extended to use policies regu-
lating different aspects of an auction. This section brieflydescribes a classification of those
aspects that we have derived from the policies provided byJCAT and those used by special-
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ists in the 2007 tournament. This classification is an extension of the parametric model of
[52]. Section 4 relates these policies to theCAT 2007 finalists.
3.1 Matching policies
Matching policies define how a market matches shouts made by traders.
Equilibrium matching(ME) is the most commonly used matching policy [21,51]. The
offers made by traders form ther ported demand and supply, which is usually different
from theunderlying demand and supplythat are determined by traders’ private values and
unknown to the specialist, since traders are assumed to be profit-seeking and make offers
deviating from their private values.ME clears the market at ther portedequilibrium price
and matches intra-marginal asks with intra-marginal bids —with an intersecting demand
and supply, the shouts on the left of the intersection (the equilibrium point) and their traders
are calledintra-marginalsince they can be matched and make profit, while those on the rig t
are calledextra-marginal. Note that a shout, or a trader, that appears to be intra-marginal or
extra-marginal in the reported demand and supply may not be so in the underlying demand
and supply.
Max-volume matching(MV) aims to increase transaction volume based on the observa-
tion that a high intra-marginal bid can match with a lower extra-marginal ask, though with
a profit loss for the buyer when compared with a match against aintra-marginal ask. A
market using this form of matching is investigated in [9].
3.2 Quoting policies
Quoting policies determine market quotes issued by markets. Typical quotes are the ask
quote and bid quotes, which respectively specify the upper bound for asks and the lower
bound for bids that may be placed in aquote-drivenmarket.
Two-side quoting6 (QT) defines the ask quote as the minimum of the lowest tentatively
matchable bid and lowest unmatchable ask, and defines the bidquote as the maximum of
the highest tentatively matchable ask and highest unmatchable bid.
One-side quoting(QO) is similar toQT, but considers only the standing shouts closest
to the reported equilibrium price from the unmatched side. When the market is cleared
continuously (see below),QO is identical toQT.
3.3 Shout accepting policies
Shout accepting policies determine if a shout made by a trader should be entered in the
market.
Always accepting(AA) accepts any shout.
Quote-beating accepting(AQ) allows only those shouts that are more competitive than
the corresponding market quote. This is commonly used in both experimental settings and
real stock markets, and is sometimes called “New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rule” since
that market adopts it. Clearly there is an interaction betwen such a policy and the quoting
policy used by the market.
6 The name follows [21] since either quote depends on information on both the ask side and the bid side.
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Equilibrium-beating accepting(AE) estimates the equilibrium price based on past trans-
action prices, and requires bids to be higher than the estimate and asks to be lower. This
policy was suggested in [25] and found to be effective in reducing transaction price fluctua-
tion and increasing allocative efficiency in markets populated withZI-C traders [14].
Self-beating accepting(AS) accepts all first-time shouts but only allows a trader to mod-
ify its standing shout with a more competitive price.AS imposes a looser restriction than
AQ for extra-marginal shouts, but a tighter one for intra-marginal shouts since traders have
to beat their standing shouts which are already more competitive han the corresponding
market quote.
Transaction-based accepting(AT) tracks the most recently matched asks and bids, and
uses the lowest matched bid and the highest matched ask to restrict the shouts to be accepted.
In a clearing house auction(CH)7 [10], the two bounds are expected to be close to the
estimate of equilibrium price inAE, while in aCDA, AT may produce much looser restriction
since extra-marginal shouts may steal a deal.
History-based accepting(AH) is inspired by theGD trading strategy.GD calculates how
likely a shout is to be matched to determine what shouts to make. AH makes the same
calculation and only accepts shouts that will be matched with probability no lower than a
specified threshold. It is named after its need for the history of shouts and transactions in
the market. Appendix A describesAH in detail as part of a simple, but powerful, market
mechanism for competing inCAT games.
3.4 Clearing conditions
Clearing conditions define when the market is cleared and trasactions are executed.
Continuous clearing(CC) attempts to clear the market whenever a new shout is placed.
Round clearing(CR) clears the market after all traders have submitted their shout . This
was the original clearing policy inNYSE, but was replaced, in the mid 1860s, byCC in
order to generate immediate transactions and handle increased volumes. WithCC, an extra-
marginal trader may have more chance to steal a deal and get matched.
Probabilistic clearing(CP) clears the market with a predefined probability,p, whenever
a shout is placed. It thus defines a continuum of clearing rules with CR (p = 0) andCC
(p = 1) being the two ends.
3.5 Pricing policies
A pricing policy is responsible for determining transaction prices for matched ask-bid pairs.
The decision making may involve only the prices of the matched ask and bid, or more
information including market quotes.
Discriminatory k-pricing(PD) sets the transaction price of a matched ask-bid pair at
some point in the interval between their prices. The parameter k ∈ [0,1] controls which
point is used and usually takes value 0.5 to avoid a bias in favor of buyers or sellers.
Uniform k-pricing(PU) is similar toPD, but sets the transaction prices for all matched
ask-bid pairs at the same point between the ask quote and the bid quote.PU cannot be used
7 A CH is another common type ofDA. Unlike theCDA it clears at a pre-specified time, allowing all traders
to place offers before any matches are found. ACH is used, for example, to set stock prices at the beginning
and the end of trading on some stock exchanges [38].
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with MV because the price intervals of some matched ask-bid pairs donot cover the spread
between the ask quote and the bid quote.
n-pricing (PN) sets the transaction price at the average of the latestn pairs of matched
asks and bids. If the average falls out of the price interval between the ask and bid to be
matched, the nearest end of the interval is used. This policy, introduced in [25], can help
reduce transaction price fluctuation and has little impact on allocative efficiency.
Side-biased pricing(PB) is basicallyPD with k set to split the profit in favor of the side
on which fewer shouts exist. Thus the more that asks outnumber bids in the current market,
the closerk is set to 0.
3.6 Charging policies
Charging policies determine how charges are imposed by a specialist. Specific strategies
provided in theJCAT source code (and explored in [26]) are the following.
Fixed charging(GF) sets charges at a specified fixed level.
Bait-and-switch charging(GB) makes a specialist cut its charges until it captures a cer-
tain market share, and then slowly increases charges to increase profit. It will adjust its
charges downward again if its market share drops below a certin level.
Charge-cutting charging(GC) sets the charges by scaling down the lowest charges of
markets imposed on the previous day. This is based on the observation that traders all prefer
markets with lower charges.
Learn-or-lure-fast charging(GL), adapts its charges towards some desired target follow-
ing the scheme used by theZIP trading strategy. If the specialist using this policy believes
that the traders are still exploring among specialists and have yet to find a good one to trade,
the specialist would adapt charges towards 0 to lure tradersto join and stay; otherwise it
learns from the charges of the most profitable market.GL uses an exploring monitor com-
ponent to determine whether traders are exploring or not. A simple exploring monitor, for
example, examines the daily distribution of market shares of specialists. If the distribution
is flat, the traders are considered exploring, and not otherwis . This is based on the obser-
vation that traders all tend to go to the best market and causen imbalanced distribution.
Another scheme for the exploring monitor is to check the trade distribution in the latest
several days and uses the relative market share gain and lossto determine whether it is good
to lure traders.
3.7 Traditional double auction mechanisms
The policies presented in the previous section can be combined to easily create auction
mechanisms, including those commonly used. Without considering the charging component,
a CDA can be represented as
ME+QT+AQ+CC+PD (1)
while aCH can be represented as
ME+AA+CR+PU (2)
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4 Characteristics of specialists in the first TAC CAT Competition
The first CAT competition was held in conjunction withAAAI in July 2007. Table 1 lists
the finalists in descending order of their final rankings8 and identifies the auction rules we
inferred from the programs of theCAT 2007 competition final (held in theTAC repository)
against the policies we described in Section 3. All specialists for which we have data fit into
the generic double auction mechanism framework introducedabove and Table 1.9
We found that most specialists in the competition usedME to clear markets at the equi-
librium price.IAMwildCAT andMertacor were the only two attempting to match competitive
intra-marginal shouts with extra-marginal shouts close tothe equilibrium point in order to
obtain high transaction success rates.QT, familiar from classicCDAs andCHs, is a popu-
lar quote policy, but its effectiveness is bound to the matching policy that is used with it
since different matching algorithms, such asME andMV, can generate significantly varying
quotes. Furthermore, quote policies only affect the performance of the specialists whenAQ
is used as an accepting policy.
Specialists use a wide range of shout accepting policies, which reflects the importance of
this aspect in performing well inCAT games. In contrast, onlyCrocodileAgent andMertacor
use a clearing condition that isn’t one of the standard policies provided inJCAT.
SinceJCAT ensures that specialists impose uniform charges on all traders registered with
it on a trading day, it is not possible to attract specific traders by levying differential charges.
However, about half the entrants managed to bias their pricing policy to promote the quality
of their trader population.
Entrants seem to have contributed more effort to charging policies than to any other
aspect of auction mechanisms. Table 3 in particular compares:
1. How charges are updated over time.
Some specialistsadapttheir charges while othersdirectly calculatethe charges that they
expect to bring a certain payoff without explicitly considering how they charge currently.
A third choice is to combine the two approaches by setting charges that movegradually
from the current level to the target level.
2. Whether different types of charges are treated differently.
About half of the specialists impose only or mainly registration fees and charges on
profits.TacTex charges only shout fees.CrocodileAgent, Havana andMANX, which don’t
have a bias towards a particular kind of fee, adapt charges without using any heuristic
knowledge of the fee types.
3. Whether traders are identified and treated differentially.
Only IAMwildCAT tracks individual traders and records information on them.
4. How much profit a trader and/or a specialist can make on average.
IAMwildCAT and jackaroo are the only two specialists that lay down a road map for
achieving some desired or target profit.IAMwildCAT is the only one that tracks the abso-
lute value of the daily overall profit of specialists, which,when small, can be exploited
by the specialist to obtain a fairly high share of the profit without imposing massive fees.
5. Whether a specialist learns from the history of charges and performances of its own
and/or the other specialists.
8 Due to technical problems, two teams,TacTex andMANX, were not able to participate in all the games.
Some teams were banned from parts of some games —PSUCAT andHavana for exceeding reconnection
limits, andCrocodileAgent, Havana, MANX, PSUCAT, TacTex, andjackaroo for invalid fees.






Table 1: Comparison between theCAT 2007 finalists.
market matching quoting accepting clearing pricing charging
IAMwildCAT ME+MV∗ QT+QO+∆ AQ+AE+AS+∆ CR PB∗ ∆
PSUCAT ME (QT) AE∗ CC PB∗ ∆
CrocodileAgent ME (QT+QO∗) AE CR∗ PN∗+PB∗ GL∗
jackaroo ME QT∗ AQ CC PN GC∗+∆
Havana ME∗ QT AQ CC PD ∆
PersianCat ME∗ (QT) AT∗+∆ CC PD GF∗+∆
Mertacor MV∗ (QT) AE∗ CR∗ PB∗ ∆
TacTex ME (QT) AA CR PD GB∗+GC∗
MANX ME QT AQ CR PD GC∗+GL∗
XX
∗ denotes a policy that can be viewed as a modified or improvedXX ; ∆ stands for some mechanism that cannot be related to any policin Section 3;(XX) represents
a quote policy that is defined by the specialist but has no effect on its behavior due to its adoption of a non-AQ accepting policy; andXX+YY means some combination
of XX andYY. PhantAgent is not included since it is not in theTAC repository.
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Table 2: The scores of specialists in our experiments. The ord r follows the ranking in the
2007 competition.









It is a common practice among the specialists for fees to be set based on information
about their competitors’ charges and performances, thoughthe lengths of history mon-
itored vary from only the previous day, to a sliding multi-day window, to the full game
history.
6. Whether a specialist tries to lure traders by charging less in the early stage of a game
(start effect) and/or imposes higher charges when the game is about to end (d a line
effect).
Most specialists feature start and deadline effects, taking advantage of a definitive game
duration and traders exploring widely at the beginning of aCAT game.
The characterization in Table 3 is a first step in establishing relationship between auction
rules and auction performance. The next step is to start to identify the effects of these rules.
5 A white-box analysis of CAT 2007 entries
To further examine the specialists that participated in theCAT 2007 competition, we ran a
series of games with the same setup as in the 2007 final games.
5.1 Experimental setup
Every game in our experiment ran for 500 trading days with 10 1-second rounds per day.
There were 180ZIP traders, 180RE traders, 20ZI-C traders, and 20GD traders. For each
type of trader there were an equal number of buyers and seller. The private values of all
the traders were independently drawn from a uniform distribu ion between 50 and 150, and
each trader was allowed to buy or sell up to three commoditiesper day. The specialists in
our games include all eight of the 2007 specialists in the repository on theTAC website
that we were able to run —Havana, which is in the repository, requires theCPLEX library
which we do not have access to. The game server and all the clients were run on a single
machine, a different setup from theCAT 2007 final games where entrants ran their specialists
on machines that connected to the game server over the Internet. We used the same scoring
criteria as in the tournament [12] (these were briefly described in Section 2.4), but, unlike the
tournament, all the game days were assessed. The results andplots shown in the following













profitability fee history score history start
effect
deadline
effecttraders specialists self others self others
IAMwildCAT ⇒◦ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ❙ ❙   ✓ ✓
PSUCAT ◦⇒ ✓ ✗10 ✗ ✗ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ✓ ✓
CrocodileAgent ◦⇒◦ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗     ✓ ✗
jackaroo ⇒◦ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ✓ ✓
Havana ⇒◦ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗     ✓ ✗
PersianCat ◦⇒ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ❙ ✗ ❙ ✗ ✓ ✓
Mertacor ⇒◦ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ❙ b ❙ b ✓ ✓
TacTex ◦⇒ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ❙ ❙ b b ✓ ✗
MANX ⇒◦ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ❙ ❙   ✗ ✗
✓ has this feature ✗ does not have this feature sliding window ❙ single day b full history
◦⇒ adapting ⇒◦ direct calculation ◦⇒◦ gradual learning
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(b) Daily market share.







(c) Daily profit share.










(d) Daily Transaction success rate.
Fig. 2: Scores of specialists in our experiments. For key, see Fig 3. In all figures, the x-axis
displays the number of trading days, and the y-axis gives therelevant score for each trader.
sections were averaged over a total of ten games and each datum is the average of a ten-day
sliding window around it.
The scores obtained by specialists in our experiments (Table 2) broadly agree with the
rankings in the tournament [45]. The 2007CAT champion,IAMwildCAT, scores highest in our
experiments andPSUCAT, which placed second in the competition, comes second. The only
changes in ranking are due toTacTex andMANX increasing their scores since they could fully
participate in every game. Fig. 2 shows the daily componentsof the scores and Fig. 3 shows
the daily charges made.
5.2 Trader migration
The competition among specialists is reflected directly by the migration of intra-marginal
traders and extra-marginal traders. Traders migrate basedon stimates of expected profits,
where the estimate for a given specialist is based on past experi nce with that specialist.
Generally speaking, the more intra-marginal traders and the fewer extra-marginal traders
in a market, the more potential profit there is, and the easierit is to make transactions and
achieve a high transaction success rate. To measure the balance of intra-marginal and extra-
16 Jinzhong Niu et al.

















































Fig. 3: Daily fees charged by specialists in our experiments. I all figures the x-axis displays
the number of trading days.





whereDi is the intra-marginal demand — the equilibrium — andDe is the extra-marginal
demand. The marginal coefficient of supply,βS can be defined similarly.βD varies between
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(a) Daily marginal coefficient of demand,βD.





(b) Daily equilibrium profit.
Fig. 4: Properties of daily equilibria for individual specialists. For key, see Fig 3. In both
figures, the x-axis displays the number of trading days.
0 and 1. A value of 0 indicates that all the buyers in the marketar extra-marginal while 1
indicates that all the buyers are intra-marginal. Fig. 4(a)shows the daily value ofβD for the
specialists. SinceβD provides no information on the absolute equilibrium quantity or profit,
Fig. 4(b) gives the daily equilibrium profits in these markets.
As Fig. 4(a) shows,βD ≈ 0.5 in all the markets when the game starts. ThenβD of
IAMwildCAT TacTex, and PSUCAT increases while that ofCrocodileAgent, PersianCat, and
Mertacor decreases. Since a fallingβD indicates losing intra-marginal traders and/or gaining
extra-marginal traders, these changes indicate that intra-marginal traders and extra-marginal
traders have different preferences over the different markets.
Intra-marginal traders seem to be sensitive to matching policies and charges, especially
charges on profit. However, they seem to be relatively insensitive to other charges as long
as they can still profit from trades. Fig. 4(a) shows thatβD of Mertacor, PersianCat, and
CrocodileAgent decreases significantly at the beginning of the game and remains low all the
way through the game. However these decreases occur for diffe ent reasons.
The low allocative efficiency ofMertacor, shown in Fig. 5, means a great portion of
the potential social welfare is not achieved, suggesting aninefficient matching policy.11 A
close examination ofMertacor’s mechanism found that itsMV-like matching policy strate-
gically executes extra-marginal trades so as to increase its transaction success rate, but this
leads to much lower profit for intra-marginal traders involved in those trades. In addition,
Mertacor disregards the unmatched shouts every time the market is cleared. The traders that
make these shouts are then unable to either improve their standing shouts or place new ones
since the game server believes they still have active shouts. Some of these traders may be
intra-marginal traders, causing unrealized intra-marginal trades. These two issues provide
sufficient reason for intra-marginal traders to flee.
PersianCat andCrocodileAgent both lose traders due to imposing high profit charges.
PersianCat charges 100% on profit for the whole game, as shown in Fig. 3(e), and this drives
βD down very quickly.CrocodileAgent levies a lower fee thanPersianCat and therefore has
11 During theCAT 2007 competition, some specialists announced invalid feeson some trading days, causing
them to be banned from the games for a certain period. This is equivalent to the use of a very inefficient
matching policy. Our experiments rounded their fees into the valid ranges and avoided banning the specialists.
18 Jinzhong Niu et al.









Fig. 5: Daily allocative efficiency in the markets. For key, see Fig 3. The x-axis displays the
number of trading days.
a modestly decreasingβD as shown in Fig. 4(a). The decrease ofβD in PSUCAT andjackaroo
starting from days 250-300 follows the aggressive increasein the profit fee.
The rest of the specialists have much higherβD despite their use of similar policies.
IAMwildCAT, for instance, though adopting a version ofMV, refrains from using it in the
early rounds of a day, which usually are sufficient to realizemost intra-marginal trades.MANX,
though levying a high, yet volatile, profit fee, also levies other fees without bias consider-
ations, which together scare away both extra-marginal traders and intra-marginal traders
at an approximately same pace. ItsβD therefore zigzags around 0.5. The three specialists
that obtain aβD higher than 0.6 during the most time of the game,IAMwildCAT, PSUCAT, and
TacTex, all produce allocative efficiency higher than 85%, again suggesting the importance
of matching policies in keeping a high-quality trader population.
Registration fees appear to help to filter out extra-marginal traders, and information fees
have the same effect onGD andZIP traders (which require such information). Figs. 3(a) and
3(b) show thatIAMwildCAT andjackaroo constantly impose one or both of these fees. As a
result, the numbers of extra-marginal traders in those markets falls the most (see Fig. 6).
Shout fees also affect extra-marginal traders, but the degree of the effect depends on
the shout accepting policy used. If the accepting policy is astrong filter and extra-marginal
traders have little chance to place shouts, they can avoid los ng money due to charges and
thus are indifferent to shout charges. Their staying with a specialist therefore does not harm
to the market’s transaction success rate, and on the contrary, only adds to its market share.
TacTex, uniquely among the specialists, charges only shout fees and co sistently does so all
the way through the game, as shown in Fig. 3(c). This policy together with itsAA accepting
policy — the weakest one possible — causes the extra-marginal traders to leave quickly as
Fig. 6 demonstrates.
Mertacor managed to attract a lot of extra-marginal traders during the first 200 days, as
shown in Fig. 6, due to its policy of not charging. Its policy change, starting to charge heav-
ily on registration as in Fig. 3(a), explains why it loses almost all its extra-marginal traders
shortly afterwards and itsβD increases significantly around day 200. Actually, higher regis-
tration fees inPSUCAT after day 150 andPersianCat after day 200, are both accompanied with
a loss of market share in extra-marginal traders.CrocodileAgent increases its registration fee
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as well around day 200 but the modestly increased fee is stilllower than those charged by
most of other specialists, therefore it is still popular among extra-marginal traders.
In conclusion, extra-marginal traders, as expected, flee from those markets with high
registration fees and information fees (and high shout feesin TacTex) to other markets, while
intra-marginal traders migrate from markets with high profit fees and inefficient matching
policies to those that do not have high charges and realize the most potential social welfare.
5.3 Learning and adaptation in specialists
The numbers of traders registered daily with the specialists, the profit made in the mar-
kets, and the daily charges made by the markets are all accessible to specialists viaCATP.
This makes it possible for specialists to learn and adapt their own policies. The transaction
success rates however are unavailable unless a specialist is willing to obtain shout and trans-
action information directly from other specialists, paying any necessary fees. Specialists’
payments for this purpose are not observed during the games.
Though specialists may adapt various types of auction policies, changes in charging
policies are more obvious than other aspects from the data collected.MANX copies the charges
of the leading markets in terms of profit share and market share combined, producing the
most scattered charges among the specialists through the games. Looking at its charges gives
us an approximate pattern of adaption of the other markets:
1. At the start,PersianCat charges the most (though only profit fees) while most of the
others do not charge.
2. TacTex then starts to impose shout fees, but its payoff and winning position is not sus-
tainable. Its market share declines significantly as seen inFig. 2(b) around day 20.
3. Around day 50,jackaroo begins to impose heavy fees of all types, and likeTacTex,
jackaroo’s market share decreases. Fig. 2(b) shows that before day 50, jackaroo attracts
more and more traders, but after that, traders flee, quickly at first and then more slowly.
Figs. 4(a), 4(b), and 2(b) further indicate that intra-marginal traders are more sensitive
and flee faster than extra-marginal traders immediately after day 50, causing a plunge in
market share immediately after day 50 and an increasingβD between days 50 and 100.
Around day 100,βD starts to drop as well, suggesting extra-marginal traders leave at a
slower and slower pace and intra-marginal traders continueo leave.
4. From around day 85,IAMwildCAT, which had previously not charged, starts to charge
registration fees, as shown in Fig. 3(a), which scares away extra-marginal traders, and
Fig. 4(a) shows a significantly faster increase ofβD. PSUCAT later does the same thing
and causes an increasingβD before days 100 and 150.12
5. IAMwildCAT andjackaroo, are designed to take advantage of the known length of games.
They both increase their charges to much higher levels and make huge profits during the
last days of the games, thoughJCAT takes measures to avoid traders going bankrupt in
this situation and disregards any charges that traders cannot pay. The huge daily profits
obtained, however, did not greatly increase the final scoresf these specialists since the
scoring mechanism adopted byCAT normalizes profits before scoring.
12 The y axis in Fig. 3(a) has an upper bound of 2, and does not showt e constant registration charges
of 10 made byPSUCAT in the second half of the game. We do this to obtain a better general view, avoiding
the chargs of other specialists (usually below 2) being squeezed together and becoming unreadable. The even
higher charges by the specialists near the end of the game arenot shown in Figs. 3(a)-3(d) for the same reason.
20 Jinzhong Niu et al.








































































































































































































Fig. 6: Supply and demand curves for individual markets overtime. Each graph has quantity
on the x-axis and price on the y-axis. The leftmost graph gives supply and demand on day
0, and the remaining graphs in each row are those from days 50,100, 150, 300, and 499
respectively. These graphs are from the same single run of the game.
The comparison between the charges ofMANX, which copies charges, and those of the spe-
cialists mentioned above clearly shows which have adapted th ir policies and become the
daily front-runners at each point.
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IAMwildCAT exhibits stable performance according to almost all criteria and is worth
further investigation. Profit share is the most sensitive metric since fee changes may im-
mediately and dramatically cause the relative profit sharesto go up or down. In Fig. 2(c),
TacTex, jackaroo, andPSUCAT, one after another, increase their charges and claim big profit
shares. However every subsequent increase leads to an apparent rofit share drop for the
previous front-runner, including whatIAMwildCAT does toPSUCAT by increasing its profit
charge gradually as shown in Fig. 3(e).13 Despite this common theme,IAMwildCAT is to a
great extent immune to the changes of other specialists’ charges in terms of its profit share.
This should be attributed to its target-oriented charging policy and the direct calculation of
fees to achieve a certain target profit.Mertacor takes a similar approach, but its sub-optimal
calculation method and other problematic auction rules prevent the approach from working
well.
5.4 Discussion
Here we extract some general guidance for market design fromthe analysis above.
5.4.1ME versusMV
If a high transaction success rate is desirable, then specialists have to explicitly take this into
account, for example by matching intra-marginal and extra-marginal shouts, asMV does.
However, caution should exercised when using anMV-like policy.
MV may cause intra-marginal traders to lose profits and in a competitive situation may
lead them to prefer non-MV markets. This is exactly what happened toMertacor. In addition,
the extra-marginal trades may lower market efficiency.IAMwildCAT’s matching policy is a
mixture of ME and anMV-like policy. It uses the former in the first few rounds and the
latter in the rest of the day. Fig. 2(d) shows thatIAMwildCAT obtains high transaction success
rates, very close or equal to 100%, after day 150 when the specialist starts to use theMV-like
policy for more rounds in a day. As a consequence,IAMwildCAT’s efficiency has a striking 5%
drop, as shown in Fig. 5. UnlikeMertacor, IAMwildCAT did not show a loss of intra-marginal
traders when it did this. This is because most of the intra-margin l traders traded in the early
rounds of each day — when theMV-like policy was used, most of the traders still shouting
were extra-marginal traders, few shouts made by these traders can pass the specialist’s shout
accepting policy, and these limited extra-marginal shoutsdid no great harm to the remaining
intra-marginal traders.
Since traders are profit-seeking,MV-like policies can actually increase market allocative
efficiency in some cases. For instance, a greedy intra-marginal trader may make an extra-
marginal shout, which, whenME is used, will not be matched and therefore add to the
number of unrealized intra-marginal trades. WhenMV is used, this extra-marginal shout
can be matched by an intra-marginal trader, and the efficiency loss can thus be reduced or
avoided. However, as [9] point out, such a matching policy manot gain much in volume
and may be much less efficient.
13 The increase of shout fees inTacTex around day 300 may also play a role in loweringPSUCAT’s profit
share.
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(a) Underlying demand, as calculated from trader private val-
ues.










(b) Reported demand, as calculated from shouts
Fig. 7: Daily mean demand prices. For key, see Fig 3. The x-axis displays the number of
trading days.
5.4.2 Open versus closed shout accepting
Shout accepting policies have a direct impact on the effectiv ness of other auction rules.
An open shout accepting policy places a heavy burden on the matching policy. When the
matching policy is also ineffective, intra-marginal traders fail to profit and tend to leave.
In contrast, if the shout accepting policy filters out most extra-marginal shouts, a simple
matching policy can work well.
For example,CrocodileAgent andPersianCat have similar trader populations in terms
of competitiveness as shown in Figs. 4(a), 6, and 7(a), and they both use theME matching
policy. However, they produce significantly different shout sets as shown in Fig. 7(b) and
transaction success rates as illustrated in Fig. 2(d). Thisis due to theAE accepting policy in
CrocodileAgent, which is much more effective than the policy inPersianCat.
In addition,AQ, the common shout accepting policy, may leave the door wide-open
at the start of days. InCAT games, shouts automatically expire at the end of a day. This
resets the market quotes inAQ and loses valuable information from the previous day on
the underlying demand and supply schedules, which do not usually change dramatically
over days. This may explain whyjackaroo andMANX, the twoAQ markets, with higher mean
theoretical demand prices in Fig. 7(a) and better shaped demand and supply as shown in
Fig. 6 than those inCrocodileAgent, produce bid sets with lower mean prices as in Fig. 7(b)
and lower transaction success rates.
We believe a good shout accepting policy in the currentCAT game setting should be able
to reflect the collective properties of traders and carry this knowledge from day to day, as
the history-based policyAH does. We expect most specialists would be better off usingAH,
and later in the paper we present some experimental evidencethat suports this suggestion.
PSUCAT’s customizedAE is another potential policy. The mean theoretical demand price in
the PSUCAT market jumps around day 100 in Fig. 7(a), andβD follows in Fig. 4(a), but this
did not cause the mean bid price in Fig. 7(b) to climb as well, indicating the effectiveness
of its shout accepting policy, which successfully prevented extra-marginal traders placing
shouts.
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5.4.3 Market share versus profits
In CAT games it is common for specialists to find that increasing fees can boost profits but
gradually lead to loss of market share. If market share fallstoo low, however, such profits
cannot be sustained. In contrast, low charges help to gain market share but harm profits. If
a charging policy is properly designed, it may keep both measures at suitably high levels.
Imposing small, flat, fees, after a game has been running for awhile, may not have much
negative effect on market shares if the good reputation of a specialist has been established
and the traders continue to make a profit that is much higher than t e fees. In this way, on
the basis of a big market share, small fees may still bring a considerable amount of profit.
IAMwildCAT demonstrates this.
Bias towards different types of fees in charging policies can also benefit specialists.
For example,IAMwildCAT and PSUCAT use registration fees to drive extra-marginal traders
away. Reducing the number of extra-marginal traders makes it easy for the remaining trader
population to find partners, and for the specialists to obtain high transaction success rates.
However as discussed in Section 5.2, a powerful shout accepting olicy may make this
unnecessary or even harmful, since such a policy may filter out m st extra-marginal shouts
and avoid their negative effect on transaction success rate. With a strong shout accepting
policy and without charges on registration and information, a market actually becomes a free
place for extra-marginal traders to stay. If other markets impose these charges, these traders
are sure to be willing to stay with a market that doesn’t charge, and hence boost market
share.
5.4.4 Targeted versus non-targeted charges
Specialists in the competition adapt their daily charges differently, as shown in Table 3.
Some do this by setting specific performance targets, determining these targets from esti-
mates of the expected actions of other specialists, while oth rs increase or decrease their
current charges without setting targets or modeling the effct of the changes.IAMwildCAT,
for instance, determines a reasonable portion of the profit it desires to make via registration
fees, and calculates its registration fee and profit fee by taking into consideration the average
profit a trader has been able to make in its market. In contrast, p rameter values and charge
levels of most other specialists are decided rather arbitraily. As a result,IAMwildCAT has a
stable performance in the face of changes by other specialists.
Several specialists are reactive, copying the fees that other, well-performing, specialists
charge.MANX in particular does this. This approach is problematic for two reasons. First, it
is usually based on a short-term assessment and may not optimize he long-term outcome.
Second, copying a winning specialist may not be a winning strategy. The effect of fees is
closely linked to the other auction rules that specialists adopt and the properties of their
trader population at that moment [26].MANX’s follow-the-leader approach demonstrates im-
pressive performance during the early part of a game when thetrad r populations in all in-
dividual markets are quite similar. However it fails to leadto a similar outcome after traders
have converged to prefer different markets.
6 A black-box analysis of CAT 2007 entries
The above white-box analysis is feasible only when the internal structure of each specialist is
known, and can only be conducted in very limited situations because it requires a thorough
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manual examination of game dynamics. A black-box analysis abstr cts away the internal
structure of the specialists and many details of the dynamics during the interaction between
specialists, making it possible to consider many more situations. However, an exhaustive
black-box analysis may still involve high complexity. Thisis due to the fact that a game may
have an arbitrary number of entrants and an arbitrary numberof specialists.14 The results of
n-entrant,m-specialist games may not necessarily agree with the results of (n+1)-entrant,
m-specialist games, orn-entrant,(m+1)-specialist games. For instance, entrantA beatingB
in a bilateral game does not necessarily imply thatA would still beatB when an additional
entrantC joins the game, no matter whetherC uses either of the specialists used byA and
B, or a third, new specialist. This suggests, for example, that the replicator dynamics fields
reported in [32] based on 6-agent auction games or in [16] based on 6-agentTAC SCM games
are likely to change when a different set of game profiles are used.
To further explore theCAT 2007 entries, we ran two more sets of experiments — multi-
lateral simulations with games involving all the specialists and bilateral simulations with
games each involving two specialists. In some of these experiments, we considered an ad-
ditional specialist,MetroCat. MetroCat is aCDA market using theAH shout accepting policy,
and a detailed description of the implementation is provided in Appendix A. Since we de-
veloped the competition platform,MetroCat was not an entry in the competition, but it was
included in theJCAT source code provided to entrants to the 2007 Market Design game to
support the development of their specialists (rather as Axelrod provided a description of
“Tit for Two Tats” to entrants in the initial Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament [1]). Here we
useMetroCat as a benchmark in our post-tournament experiments. Note thathe inclusion
of MetroCat is the only substantive deviation that our experiments makefrom the format of
the Market Design game as it ran in 2007. We do not, for example, consider more entrants
than the eight considered above (aside from introducingMetroCat) and we concentrate on
situations in which each entrant uses a different specialist. This is because our aim here is
to learn more about the competition rather than to perform anexhaustive analysis of ways
the competition might have unfolded and because an exhaustive analysis was not feasible
since each game runs for around five hours.15 A full understanding of theCAT game would,
however, require such an exhaustive analysis.
6.1 Multi-lateral simulations
Inspired by ecological analyses like [1,37] — in which more copies of successful special-
ists, and less copies of unsuccessful specialists are run foeach successive game — but
constrained by the number of specialists that we could have in a single game, we ran the
following experiment. One copy of each of the specialist from the 2007CAT competition
was run for the full five hundred days of the game. The specialists in this game we consid-
ered to be the first “generation” of the analysis. We then ran asecond game, with a second
generation of specialists. This second generation still contained one copy of each specialist,
but each was run for the fraction of the 500 trading days proportional to the score of that
specialist in the first generation (as a fraction of the totalscore). A third generation was then
14 Each entrant has a choice of developing a new specialist or reusing one from the repository so there
could be less distinct specialists than entrants.
15 Irrespective of the hardware — the length of each trading dayis hard-coded at a constant that permits
each specialist to take time to perform possibly complex computations — any reduction in this time would
potentially distort the results by preventing some specialists from performing as designed.
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run in which each specialist was run for a number of trading days that matched the score
that specialist obtained in the second experiment, and so on.
Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) show the result of this simulation. The distribution on the y-axis
shows the proportion of the total number of trading days for all m rkets that are allotted to
each market, indicating how this evolves in populations without and withMetroCat respec-
tively. Fig. 8(a) shows that withoutMetroCat:
– the results of this analysis agree with the results reportedin [23], again confirming that
IAMwildCAT was the strongest entry in the 2007 competition; and
– the days allotted toPersianCat shrink more slowly than those allotted to other los-
ing specialists. This agrees with the results of bilateral games betweenIAMwildCAT and
PersianCat (described below) and suggests thatPersianCat was a strong entry, stronger
than its overall position suggests.
Fig. 8(b) shows that withMetroCat:
– MetroCat quickly dominates the other entries, doing so faster thanIAMwildCAT in Fig. 8(a),
so that by generation 8 onlyMetroCat has any trading days; and
– the CAT 2007 champion,IAMwildCAT, loses trading days faster than other entries af-
ter generation 1, indicating some weakness in its design when facing an opponent like
MetroCat.
In both cases, one specialist quickly comes to dominate the others.
6.2 Bilateral simulation
One-on-one games allow us to examine in detail the strength and weakness of each specialist
when it faces different opponents.
6.2.1 Payoff table
We ran 81 one-on-one games, that is one for every pair of the nin specialists we have
been considering, includingMetroCat and including nine self-play games. Table 4 shows the
resulting payoffs of specialists — their average daily scores — in theseCAT games. Each
payoff is averaged over ten iterations and entry(i, j) is the payoff of specialisti in the game
against specialistj. Thus in a game betweenMetroCat andIAMwildCAT, MetroCat scores 0.71
andIAMwildCAT scores 0.59.
Fig. 10 compares these payoffs pictorially using a polar coordinate system. Each plot
shows the nine specialists evenly distributed on the outer circle, the radial coordinates of the
nine vertices of the solid-line polygon represent a given specialist’s payoffs against all nine
specialists, and the radial coordinates of the nine vertices of the dashed-line polygon repre-
sent its opponents’ payoffs in these games. The solid-line polygon and the dashed-line poly-
gon overlap on the vertex that corresponds to the self-play game of the particular specialist.
For example, in Fig. 10(a), the solid-line polygon completely encloses the dashed-line one,
meaning thatMetroCat scores more than all the other specialists in bilateral competitions.16
In Fig. 10(i) the solid polygon lies within the dashed polygon showing thatMertacor loses
every bilateral game. The two polygons for all other specialists intersect, indicating a more
complex relationship between them.
16 MetroCat maintains a better balance than thoseCAT 2007 entries between market share and profit share
by keeping extra-marginal traders and preventing them fromplacing uncompetitive shouts.
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Fig. 8: Ecological simulation ofCAT 2007 entries based on multi-lateralCAT games. In both
graphs the x-axis gives the number of generations, and the y-axis gives the proportion of
each kind of specialist.





































Fig. 9: Ecological simulation ofCAT 2007 entries based on bilateralCAT games. In both
graphs the x-axis gives the number of generations, and the y-axis gives the proportion of
each kind of specialist.
Both Figs. 10(b) and 10(h) show thatIAMwildCAT, theCAT 2007 champion, surprisingly
loses, albeit narrowly, againstPersianCat, which placed sixth in the competition. This pro-
vides an explanation for the fact that in Fig. 8(a) the days for PersianCat shrink more
slowly than those for other specialists — it does well against the increasingly dominant
IAMwildCAT. IAMwildCAT losing toPersianCat along with the defeat ofPersianCat by PSUCAT
andjackaroo, suggests thatIAMwildCAT has some particular weakness that is taken advantage
of by PersianCat.
Other discrepancies, when compared to the results of the 2007 competition, include
jackaroo (which placed fourth) winning overPSUCAT (second) andCrocodile (third). These
may be significant, or may be caused by differences in the configurations forPSUCAT and
Crocodile used in the simulations andCAT 2007 games.
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Table 4: The payoff matrix of bilateralCAT games betweenCAT 2007 entries andMetroCat.
Each row gives the average daily score for that specialist ingames against all the other
specialists, and in self-play.
specialist Metro IAM PSU jack Croc MANX Tac Pers Mert
MetroCat 0.65 0.71 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.75 0.86 0.78 0.89
IAMwildCAT 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.68 0.77 0.71 0.80 0.61 0.76
PSUCAT 0.54 0.57 0.62 0.55 0.70 0.61 0.64 0.74 0.83
jackaroo 0.48 0.59 0.70 0.63 0.75 0.71 0.78 0.69 0.86
CrocodileAgent 0.44 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.46 0.62 0.59 0.73
MANX 0.54 0.59 0.61 0.58 0.51 0.64 0.72 0.62 0.69
TacTex 0.34 0.41 0.57 0.43 0.63 0.54 0.55 0.61 0.72
PersianCat 0.43 0.62 0.52 0.59 0.70 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.77
Mertacor 0.27 0.38 0.29 0.32 0.51 0.40 0.45 0.47 0.55
6.2.2 Ecological simulation
The payoff table for the bilateralCAT games can be used to approximate ecological dynam-
ics for populations involving more than two specialist types. The payoff of each specialist
type for a certain population mixture is computed as the expected payoff for this specialist
assuming that each specialist obtains the payoff it would have obtained had it computed
one-on-one with each of the other specialists in the mix. Under this assumption, Figs. 9(a)
and 9(b) show how a population that starts with an even distribution of specialists evolves
over time when, as in [1], every specialist plays against every other specialist in every gen-
eration in bilateral games, and the number of specialists inany generation is proportional to
the payoff achieved by that “breed” of specialist in the previous generation.
Comparing Fig. 9(a) with Fig. 8(a), and Fig. 9(b) with Fig. 8(b), shows that while the
winning strategies are the same, the ecological simulations based on multi-lateral games
converge much faster than those based on bilateral games (the cales on the x-axis are very
different in the two sets of plots). This may be explained by the fact that bilateral games
give strategies a chance to benefit from the ability to perform well against specific oppo-
nents, whereas in the multi-lateral games they have to be good against all opponents in
oder to survive. Another noticeable phenomenon is thatPSUCAT performs much worse in the
simulations with bilateral games than those with multi-later l games, whilejackaroo and
IAMwildCAT do the opposite. These discrepancies indicate that, as one might expect, differ-
ent game setups may lead to very different results. However,our results may be helpful to
identify the weakness in strategies by looking at the particular scenario in which a strategy
performs poorly.
6.2.3 Offense, defense, dominance, and equilibrium
To further reveal the strength and weakness of specialists,we compare specialists’ payoffs
— which we calloffense— and the payoffs they allow opponents to make — which we call
defense— when they face a same opponent.
Fig. 11(a) puts all the solid-line, offense, polygons in Fig. 10 into a single polar coor-
dinate system and Fig. 11(b) shows all the dashed-line, defens , polygons in a similar way.
The color scheme is the same as in Fig. 10. The comparison shows clearly thatMetroCat


























































































































































Fig. 10: Payoffs of self and opponents in bilateralCAT games. On the outer circles starting
from polar angle 0◦ lists the nine specialists anti-clockwise :PersianCat (0◦), MANX (40◦),
jackaroo (80◦), IAMwildCAT (120◦), MetroCat (160◦), PSUCAT (200◦), CrocodileAgent (240◦),
TacTex (280◦), andMertacor (320◦). The radial coordinates of the nine vertices of the solid-
line polygon represent a given specialist’s payoffs against all nine specialists respectively,
and those of the dashed-line polygon represent payoffs of its opponents. The overlapping
vertex of the two polygons in each plot is the self-play game of the particular specialist.
has both the strongest offense and the strongest defense, whil Mertacor exhibits almost the
opposite.
By analogy with a two-player normal-form game in which both players choose to play
like one of the nine specialists, we say a specialistdominatesanother if the offense of the





































































(b) S6,S8,S2,S5 anti-clockwise from 0◦
Fig. 12: Dominance relations based on offense.S1: CrocodileAgent, S2: IAMwildCAT, S3:
MANX, S4: Mertacor, S5: PSUCAT, S6: PersianCat, S7: TacTex, S8: jackaroo, andS9: MetroCat.
former is better than the offense of the latter for every opponent that they face.17 Consider-
ing the results of the bilateral games we can analyze them forsuch dominance relationships,
and the result is shown in Fig. 12. This represents each dominance relation with an arrow
starting from the dominated specialist to the dominating one, and the unavailability of a
dominance relation between two specialists with a dashed line. Our goal here, as is usual
in normal-form games, is less to identify the an overall dominant specialist than to reduce
the number of specialists we consider by iteratively removing dominated specialists. We
can then investigate the relative strength and weakness of the undominated specialists at a
17 Defense may also be used to define dominance but we do not invesigat this here.
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lower computational cost.18 Fig. 12(a) shows, as Fig. 11 already does, thatMetroCat domi-
nates all the other specialists whileM rtacor is almost dominated by all the rest except for
CrocodileAgent. If we eliminate the dominatingMetroCat (which, of course, was not in the
2007 competition) and any specialist that is dominated by atleast one specialist other than
MetroCat, we end up withPersianCat, IAMwildCAT, PSUCAT, andjackaroo. We are thus left
with Fig. 12(b) which shows the relationships between the off nses of the best specialists in
the 2007 competition as judged by bilateral games.
For each set of three specialists from the four, we carried out a heuristic strategy analy-
sis like that in [32,48], and Fig. 13 shows the four replicator dynamics fields that result. To
create these plots, we used Table 4 to compute the payoff for each specialist type in a certain
population mixture in the same way as in the ecological simulation above. Figs. 13(a) and
13(c) show an unstable equilibrium betweenIAMwildCAT andPersianCat. Without consider-
ing this equilibrium and the pure profiles, all other profilesl ad to a homogeneous population
— IAMwildCAT in Figs. 13(a), 13(b), and 13(c), andjackaroo in Fig. 13(d). This indicates that
IAMwildCAT comes close to dominating the winning strategies in these 3-specialist scenarios.
This clear victory may be due to the youth ofCAT tournaments (it was certainly the case that
IAMwildCAT did not win in 2008). AsCAT competitions continue, and the strategies for spe-
cialists evolve, we expect that the relative strength betwen these strategies would become
more complex and some mixed equilibrium may start to emerge.
7 Summary and Conclusions
This paper reports a post-competition study of the entrantsin he 2007TAC Market De-
sign, orCAT, competition. This work has made several novel contributions to the study of
electronic markets, and to the design and analysis of marketmechanisms.
First, this paper provides a more extensive assessment of the performance of the entrants
to the 2007 competition than was possible in the competitionself. Each competition game
ran for around 8 hours, and given the technical problems experienced by both organizers
and competitors, this meant that it was only possible to run two games during the three days
of the competition, and not all games involved all competitors. Running more games and
including all the competitors gives more definitive results, and confirms the superiority of
IAMwildCAT that was seen in the actual tournament. The various bilateraand multi-lateral
simulations we have undertaken have also revealed weaknesses of ome specialists in some
situations, for instance, the defeat ofIAMwildCAT by PersianCat in bilateral games, and the
poorer relative performance ofjackaroo in multi-lateral rather than in bilateral games.
Second, this paper provides the first classification of the strategies used by 2007 Market
Design competition entrants, and the first comparison of theeffects of these strategies in a
rigorous, systematic experiment. While there are many moreexp riments to be run before
we fully understand the comparative strengths of the strategies, we believe that these aspects
of the paper will be of help to future entrants in the competition.
Third, the paper explores the implications of the design of the various components of
double auction mechanisms, in particular the interaction between the component policies,
and their effect on auction performance. We hope that this part of the paper will help to
18 Imagine that a specialist may not be the best in a competition, but its designer may still want to improve
it rather than simply adopting the winning strategy designed by others. This reduction based on dominance
may help to zoom into those match-ups that are most worthy of examination, perhaps through a white-box
analysis.

















Fig. 13: Replicator dynamics fields for each set of three specialists from PersianCat,
jackaroo, IAMwildCAT, andPSUCAT.
guide future research on the design of double auctions, not least in suggesting new market
designs that involve new combinations of component policies.
Finally, we looked at the performance of the specialistMetroCat, which uses a history-
based shout-accepting policy derived from theGD trading strategy. RunningMetroCat against
other specialists suggests thatMe roCat would have done well had it been entered in the 2007
competition. This, in turn, suggests the importance of the specific shout-accepting policy
that is at the heart ofMetroCat, as well as indicating that the shout-accepting policy is an
important consideration in the design of a market mechanism.
The success of such a simple specialist asMetroCat also suggests that there is significant
room for improvement in the entries to the 2007 competition and this supported by other
results that we do not have room to describe here (for examplein some of the trial games,
entrants struggled to beat classic double auctions with fixed charging policies). We have
now had two further years ofCAT competitions, and in the future we aim to analyse the
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improvements in specialist performance over those competitions, and to identify the causes
of those improvements.
The bilateral games and multi-lateral games can be viewed astwo ends of a spectrum
of CAT games. The aim of running simulations based on both configurations is to explore
whether the different competition configurations lead to different results. It is hoped that
if they make no much difference — and our results suggest thatthey do not — then the
low cost of bilateral games can be used to approximate the games involving more different
individual types and different population distributions.
In related work, Kaiserset al. [18] explored the acquisition of the payoff table forn-
player games based on the payoff table for 2-player games andvice versa, both involving a
same set of strategies for players. They showed that the linear-programming-based approxi-
mation approach works well in games between trading strategies. Our simulation shows that
an approximation approach may work but would need additional tuneup so as to reduce the
distortions incurred. The discrepancies observed in this paper suggest that additional sim-
ulations may need to be run to obtain more accurate approximation. The problem they try
to solve can actually be extended into a more general one: howto build (approximately)
the payoff table forn-player games based on a set of complete or partial payoff tables each
for games involving no more thann players. Suppose, in an-player game, each player may
choose one ofsstrategies. There are thus totallyCsn+s−1 possible match-ups. If each match-
up is simulated, a heuristic payoff table would become availble to generate a replicator
dynamics field for thes strategies, where possible equilibria can be identified as well as the
relative strength of each strategy. If theCsn+s−1 match-ups be viewed as theC
s
n+s−1 discrete
points along the dimension denoted asD(n,s), the above problem becomes to run simula-
tions for points scattering along lower dimensions, e.g.,D(2,s) for 2-player games in [18],
so as to approximate the results for theCsn+s−1 points alongD(n,s). This approach would
have more flexibility and allow gradual distortion reduction ver time.
This future work is desirable because, even if such an approximation is not quantitatively
accurate, it may provide qualitative guidance on what scenarios should be investigated fur-
ther, and help to reduce the overall computational complexity. For example, the replicator
dynamics fields in both [16] and [34] suggest that if there is amixed equilibrium between
three strategies, there may be at least one mixed equilibrium between two of these strate-
gies. In addition, for a space of heuristic strategies that still expands gradually, like that for
CAT games, it is no less important to be creative — focusing on creating better strategies
— than to be fair — finding a better way to evaluate existing strategies. Shedding light on
the weaknesses of a strategy and directions to improve it maybe even more important for
strategies that are of practical importance.
Another possible line of future research is to consider the evolution of trading agents
in addition to that of specialists. To make the situation simple, the simulations in this paper
use a portfolio of trading agent strategies that does not evolv at all. It would be more
realistic, however, to have simulations with interveningCAT competitions and trading agent
competitions, so that trading agents learn to adapt their strategies as they interact with each
other and with the specialists.
A further extension is to view a market mechanism as a combination of atomic auc-
tion rules rather than being an atomic entity itself. From this point of view, there would
be multiple populations, each for a type of auction rule. Multiple individuals, one from
each population, need to collaborate to form a complete market mechanism, which can then
compete against other combinations. The payoff of a market mechanism from a simula-
tion would be used as the payoff for each individual component of the market mechanism.
This multi-population simulation may be considered as agrey-boxapproach, a mixture of
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black-box approach and white-box approach, since it consider the internal logic of special-
ist strategies. Such a grey-box approach can be used to explor a solution space, enabling
an automated solution design method, as long as a modular strategy design is available. The
parameterized framework for specialists presented in Section 3 forms an ideal foundation
for further work along this line.
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A MetroCat: A simple, but powerful, design for CAT games
We developedMetroCat, a market mechanism that instantiates the parameterized framework in Section 3,
based on several insights about theCAT game. In particular:
– It is crucial to maintain a high transaction success rate, since this rate is not immediately affected by the
performance of other markets in contrast to market share andprofit share. Thus a strong shout accepting
policy, which only allows those shouts that are likely to match with other shouts, is desirable.
– Registration and information fees should be avoided, for these fees cause losses to extra-marginal traders
and drive them away. Keeping extra-marginal traders in the market allows them to contribute through
their impact on market share.
– Moderate charges on shouts, transactions, and trader profitonly impact intra-marginal traders, and be-
cause of this they still stay with the market as long as they can m ke a considerable amount of profit
through transactions after covering fees.
These insights led us to develop aCDA-based market mechanism, which uses a history-based shout ac-
cepting policy, denoted asAH. AH is based on theGD trading strategy [13].GD selects a price that maximizes
the expected payoff, assuming that, for a given ask pricea,
– if another ask pricea′ < a was offered and was not accepted by a seller,a would not be accepted either;
– if another ask pricea′ > a was offered and accepted by a seller,a would have been accepted as well; and
– if a bid priceb > a was offered in the market,a would have been accepted.





– MA(d) is the number of asks with priced that have been matched;
– RA(d) is the number of asks with priced that were not matched; and
– B(d) is the number of bids with priced.
It is not realistic to keep a full history of shouts and transactions, soGD maintains a sliding window and only
considers those shouts and transactions in the window. Computed like this,Pr(a) is a monotonic decreasing
function, since the highera is, the lowerPr(a). It is also assumed that whena = 0.0, Pr(a) = 1, and there is
a certain valueua, whena > ua, Pr(a) = 0. The probabilityPr(b) of a given bid being accepted is computed
analogously.
AH uses exactlyPr(a) andPr(b) to estimate how likely a shout would be matched, and only accepts
those shouts with a probability higher than a specified thresholdλ ∈ [0,1]. When it is close to 1, the restriction
may become too tight for intra-marginal traders to be able toplace shouts in the market. When it is close to 0,
the restriction may become so loose that extra-marginal traders are able to place shouts that do not stand much
chance of being matched. The former would cause both the market nd the traders to lose part of the expected
profit and lead those traders to leave, and the latter would cause low transaction success rate.M troCat
usesλ = 0.5, which we found to be optimal for a game configuration similar to CAT 2007.
In addition toAH, MetroCat uses a simple charging policy that imposes low, fixed fees on sh ut ,
transactions, and trader profit, and no charges on registration nd information. The feesMetroCat imposes
on shouts, transactions, and trader profit are respectively0.1, 0.1, and 10% during the post-tournament exper-
iments described in Section 6.
As described above,MetroCat was supplied to all entrants to the 2007 Market Design game asan
example specialist that was part of theJCATpackage. Given the performance ofMetroCat in our experiments,
it seems that had any entrant used it, even without modification, hey would have won.
